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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
When one of the trial witnesses came forward and admitted that she had given the jury a
misleading version of the facts during her testimony, the district court judge properly applied the
standard for recanted, perjured testimony articulated in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380
(1985).1 The State’s argument against that decision not only contradicts the actual language in
the controlling precedent, but also ignores the rationale behind those decisions. In fact, both the
Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have explained that a motion for a new
trial based on false testimony raises different concerns, and so, requires a different test, than
motions for new trial based on other newly-discovered evidence (which is what the State
contends should have been used instead of Scroggins).
Moreover, the district court reasonably exercised its discretion in evaluating the evidence
under the Scroggins test and concluding that a new trial was warranted in light of the witness’s
admission to giving false testimony. Since the State has failed to show an abuse of discretion in
that decision, this Court should affirm the order granting Robby Washington a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After his jury trial, Mr. Washington’s ex-girlfriend, Casey White, went to police to
inform them that the testimony she had given at that trial had not been accurate, as she had
omitted relevant facts, and thus, had given a false impression about what had actually happened
to the jury. (Mtn. Tr., p.13, L.14 - p.14, L.7.)2 At the trial, Ms. White had testified on behalf of

1

Senior Judge Morfitt presided over both the jury trial and the motion for a new trial.
The transcripts in this case are provided in two separately bound and paginated volumes.
“Mtn. Tr.” refers to the transcript of the hearing held on March 9, 2018, during which
2

1

the defense that she had seen a cooler, which belonged to a friend of hers, in the back of
Mr. Washington’s car. (Trial Tr., p.302, L.22 - p.303, L.13.) She had said that she looked inside
the cooler and saw “a pipe,” “[a] blue pen cap and a scale.” (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.16-19.)
However, she later revealed that her friend had actually also given her a small, black Ziploc bag
with methamphetamine residue inside and asked her to throw it away.

(Mtn. Tr., p.13,

Ls.18-19.) Ms. White admitted that, instead, “I threw it in the cooler, told myself I need to take
it out.”3 (Mtn. Tr., p.13, Ls.19-21.) She did not mention the bag of methamphetamine at all
during her trial testimony. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.294-308.)
In both her accounts, Ms. White explained she left the items in the cooler, and sometime
later, she became upset with Mr. Washington about an unrelated matter and wanted to get back at
him. (Trial Tr., p.305, L.19 - p.306, L.12; Mtn. Tr., p.10, Ls.6-15.) To do that, she said she
called police and reported that Mr. Washington was in possession of drugs. (Trial Tr., p.305,
Ls.1-3; Mtn. Tr., p.10, Ls.16-17.)
Based on her report, Officer Coleman located Mr. Washington as he was going to a pawn
shop. (Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.11-13.) Talel Aref, an employee of the pawn shop, testified that
Mr. Washington came into the shop carrying a briefcase in which he had a laptop which he
wanted to pawn. (Trial Tr., p.312, L.24 - p.314, L.6.) He testified that, when Mr. Washington
opened the briefcase to get the laptop out, Mr. Aref could see inside the briefcase, and he did not

Mr. Washington’s motion for a new trial was addressed. “Trial Tr.” refers to the transcript of the
testimony at the jury trial held on January 9-10, 2018, and which was included as an exhibit in
this record.
3
Ms. White testified that she thought she had told the investigator at the public defender’s office
about putting the methamphetamine in the cooler. (Mtn. Tr., p.16, Ls7-14.) However, the
investigator testified that he had surreptitiously recorded the interview with Ms. White, and she
had not actually mentioned that fact. (Mtn. Tr., p.26, Ls.14-15, p.29, Ls.15-21.) It does not
appear that the recording of the investigator’s interview with Ms. White was admitted as
evidence at the motion hearing. (See generally Mtn. Tr.)

2

see anything besides the laptop and charger. (Trial Tr., p.314, Ls.7-22.) Officer Coleman saw
Mr. Washington leave the pawn shop carrying the briefcase and get back in his car. (Trial
Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.)
As Mr. Washington drove out of the pawn shop’s parking lot, Officer Coleman saw him
fail to stop and quickly pulled him over. (Trial Tr., p.9, L.8 - p.10, L.6.) After a canine officer
reported that his dog alerted on the car, officers searched the car. 4 (Trial Tr., p.87, L.3-6.)
Officer Woodward, the canine officer, left his body camera running as he searched part of the
car, but he did not find anything of interest. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.7-11, p.190, L.19 - p.191, L.5.)
Officer Coleman, on the other hand, shut off his body camera before he began searching
the car. (Trial Tr., p.98, Ls.10-14.) Unlike Officer Woodward, he found several items of
interest. First, he testified he found the cooler in the back seat, and that, inside the cooler, he
found a pipe with green residue inside a Crown Royal bag, a container with a leafy green
substance in it, a second container with a leafy green residue inside, and a digital scale. (Trial
Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.18, L.2.) Second, he testified he found the briefcase and that, inside the
briefcase, he found a second pipe with crystal residue inside a second Crown Royal bag, a pen
cap with crystal residue, and a black Ziploc bag with powdery residue in it. (Trial Tr., p.20,
L.25 - p.22, L.13.) Officer Coleman admitted that he did not photograph, nor did he request
anyone else photograph, any of the items, either as he found them in the cooler and the briefcase
or separately. (Trial Tr., p.100, L.9 - p.101, L.24, p.103, L.3 (“I took no photographs of any
kind.”).) In fact, he admitted that, though he had seized the cooler and other containers, he did

4

Mr. Washington filed a motion to suppress in which he challenged various aspects of the
alleged alert on his car which the district court denied. (R., pp.63-65, 102-23.) The propriety of
that decision is not at issue in this appeal.

3

not seize the briefcase as evidence at all. (Trial Tr., p.105, Ls.7-10; see Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.6-15
(testifying that the cooler was part of State’s Exhibit 4).)
Based on the fruits of the officers’ search, the State charged Mr. Washington with
possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.60-62.) The prosecutor only alleged possession of “a glass pipe to inhale a controlled
substance and/or a digital scale to pack or repack a controlled substance” as the basis for the
paraphernalia charge. (R., p.61.)
Partway through the trial, the district court granted Mr. Washington’s motion to dismiss
the marijuana charge with prejudice based on a discovery violation by the State. (R., pp.168-69,
185.) As a result, it held that no further evidence about the marijuana would be admitted during
the trial. (R., p.172.) During their deliberations, the jury sought clarification in that regard,
asking whether “stuff in cooler thrown out?” and making specific reference to the glass pipe and
the scale. (R., p.176.) After discussing the matter with counsel, the district court answered:
The Information charged the defendant with possession of paraphernalia, to-wit: a
glass pipe and/or a digital scale. The jury must determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the defendant possessed either a glass pipe or a digital scale; or
both. The issue of possession of marijuana is not before the jury. Therefore,
State’s Exhibits 3 & 4 are not before the jury for its consideration. You may
consider all of the remaining Exhibits, which have been given to you.
(R., p.176.) The jury subsequently asked if the pipe referenced in the charging document
referred to “the item contained in Exhibit 1 or the item in Exhibit 2 – the green pipe?” 5
(R., p.176.) The district court simply answered that was a question of fact for the jury to
determine, as both exhibits were still before the jury for consideration. (R., p.176) The jury

5

State’s Exhibit 1 contained items which were allegedly found in the briefcase. (Trial Tr., p.26,
Ls.8-18.) State’s Exhibit 2 contained items which were allegedly found in both the cooler and
the briefcase. (Trial Tr., p.33, Ls.9-15, p.34, Ls.12-15.)

4

ultimately found Mr. Washington guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., p.180.)
The district court ruled on Mr. Washington’s motion for a new trial from the bench. It
explained that while it had reviewed State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976), under which
the parties had argued the motion, it had also found Scroggins as well as other cases which
discussed the difference between Drapeau and Scroggins. (Tr., p.40, L.22 - p.41, L.7.) It
explained that Scroggins controlled the analysis in this case because it involved a witness
recanting her trial testimony by admitting it was, “if not false, substantially and seriously
misleading and certainly not fully truthful.” (Mtn. Tr., p.41, L.8 - p.42, L.4.) The district court
acknowledged that “a couple of the cases I cited refer to a government witness. But if there is
recanted testimony given, I don’t believe -- I don’t see any difference between whether it’s by a
witness for the defense or by the government witness,” and pointed out that, in one of the cases,
the standard referred to “testimony given by a material witness.” (Mtn. Tr., p.45, Ls.14-23
(citing Bean v. State, 119 Idaho 632, 638 (1991).)6
The district court made several specific findings under the Scroggins standard. It found
Ms. White, “if not testifying falsely, at least substantially misled the jury.” (Mtn. Tr., p.43,
Ls.11-12.) It also concluded that “the defense has met their burden of showing that such
changed testimony may result in a finding -- that it’s material to a finding of guilt or innocence
and the testimony was on a material matter.” (Mtn. Tr., p.43, Ls.1-6.) Finally, it found that

6

The particular citation the district court gave actually refers to partial concurrence and partial
dissent authored by Justice Bistline. However, the majority of the Bean Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals’ decision under Scroggins, and the Court of Appeals used similar language to that
which Justice Bistline used when describing the applicable standard. See Bean v. State, 119
Idaho 645, 646-47 (Ct. App. 1990), modified on other grounds and affirmed by Bean, 119 Idaho
632.

5

Mr. Washington “was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and did not -- or did
not know of its falsity until after the trial.” (Mtn. Tr., p.45, Ls.1-4.) Based on those findings, the
district court granted Mr. Washington’s motion for a new trial. (R., p.211.) The State filed a
notice of appeal timely from that order. (R., pp.219-21.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err in concluding that Ms. White’s additional testimony that she placed
some of the contraband in the cooler merited a new trial?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding That Ms. White’s Additional Testimony That She
Placed Some Of The Contraband In The Cooler Merited A New Trial

A.

Standard Of Review
The district court’s decision to grant a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Ellington (Ellington I), 151 Idaho 53, 72 (2011). An abuse of discretion will
be found in such cases “if the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence or if it did not properly apply the relevant law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); accord
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, ___, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (explaining that a
district court abuses its discretion if (1) it fails to appreciate the issue is one within its discretion,
(2) does not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion, (3) does not act in a manner
consistent with the applicable legal standards, or (4) does not reach its decision in an exercise of
reason). In this appeal, the State has only argued under the third and fourth prongs of the abuse
of discretion test. (App. Br., p.14.)

B.

The District Court Was Correct – Scroggins Controls The Analysis In This Case
The Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals are clear that “‘Scroggins provides

the standard for evaluating of recanted testimony in Idaho.’” Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73
(quoting State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1986)).

Since Ms. White was

recanting the version of events she gave in her trial testimony because that version of events was
inaccurate and not fully truthful, the district court properly concluded that Scroggins governs the
analysis in this case.
The State’s argument to the contrary – that this case should be governed by the standard
for other new evidence articulated in Drapeau (App. Br., pp.8-10) – ignores the fact that both the

8

Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have explained that motions based on
recanted, perjured testimony raise different concerns than motions based on other newlydiscovered evidence, and so, the two need to be assessed under different standards:
“Perjured testimony affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that
overlooked evidence does not. WRIGHT, §557.1.[7] Moreover, while a rigorous
standard for obtaining a second trial upon new evidence may be justified as an
incentive for the parties to marshal evidence and to present it at the first trial, the
parties need no such incentive to combat perjury.”
State v. Lankford (Lankford I), 116 Idaho 860, 874 (1989) (quoting Lawrence, 112 Idaho at
151-52). Thus, “‘[e]xceping evidence of recantation, any other type of new evidence presented
by a defendant as an alleged basis for a new trial, including other types of proof of perjury and
evidence of a recantation that has itself been subsequently disavowed, are subject to the Drapeau
test.’” Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73 (quoting State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366 (Ct. App.
2007)) (emphasis added). As such, the State’s argument that the district court should have
applied Drapeau instead of Scroggins flies directly in the face of well-established precedent.
That rationale behind those decisions also shows the district court correctly concluded
that Scroggins applies to recantations by both government and defense witnesses.

(Mtn.

Tr., p.45, Ls.14-23.) If a defense witness perjures her testimony, there is no less impact on the
integrity of the judicial process than if a government witness does so. See Bean, 119 Idaho at
646-47 (applying Scroggins when the co-defendant, who was not a government witness, but who
testified in his own defense during a joint trial against himself and Mr. Bean, recanted that
testimony).
In fact, when Scroggins adopted the standard for evaluating whether recanted, perjured
testimony should result in a new trial, it specifically described the first prong of the test as
7

3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL §557 (2d ed. 1982).

9

requiring “that ‘[t]he court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the material
witness is false.’” Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384 (quoting Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82,
87-88 (7th Cir. 1928)) (emphasis added); accord State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 914 (1995).
Defense and government witness can both be material witnesses since a witness is material when
her testimony has “some logical connection to the consequential facts.” Ellington I, 151 Idaho at
74. In other words, when a witness testifies as to facts which tend to prove or disprove the
elements of the offense, their testimony is material. See State v. Ellington (Ellington II), 157
Idaho 480, 486 (2014) (explaining evidence is material when it “provide[s] evidence for or
against any proposition advanced by either party.”).
Nevertheless, the State maintains the district court’s conclusion in that regard was wrong
because most of the scenarios in which Scroggins has been used involve a prosecution witness
recanting her testimony and the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[u]se of the Scroggins test
‘should be confined to a specific set of facts.’” (App. Br., p.8 (quoting Ellington I, 151 Idaho at
73).) However, the State has taken that quote from Ellington I out of context. The whole quote
actually reads:
The Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the language in the Scroggins case
suggests that the use of that standard should be confined to a specific set of facts
“when a trial witness has recanted his or her trial testimony and evidence of that
recantation has been presented to the trial court.”
Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73 (quoting Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366). Thus, the very statement to
which the State quotes actually belies its argument – it expressly recognizes that Scroggins
applies to the factual scenario where “a trial witness,”8 not a government witness, has recanted

8

A trial witness will, in the vast majority of cases, be a material witness because their testimony
will tend to prove or disprove a consequential fact. If it did not, their testimony would not be
relevant, and thus, would not be admissible in the first place. See I.R.E. 401-02.

10

her testimony. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, this case falls directly within the specific set of
facts Scroggins covers because Ms. White was, in fact, a trial witness who recanted her
testimony before the district court.
Besides, if the focus truly were on whether a government witness had given perjured
testimony, as the State contends, the proper standard would actually be the one the United States
Supreme Court articulated in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Napue held the government
cannot knowingly use false evidence to get a conviction, lest it violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.9 Id. at 269. Since misconduct by a State agent in his
testimony is imputed to the prosecutor, Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 62, perjury by a government
witness would amount to the State knowingly trying to use false evidence to secure a conviction.
The problem for the State’s argument is that Napue sets a lower bar than Scroggins does.
Napue only requires the defendant to show that the false evidence “may have had an effect on
the outcome of the trial,” that it contributed to the decision the jury rendered in this case. Napue,
360 U.S. at 272. Scroggins, on the other hand, actually requires the moving party to show that
the jury might actually have reached a different conclusion. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85.
That means the State’s attempt to limit Scroggins only to situations where a government witness
commits perjury is actually an improper request for this Court to set a higher floor than the
United States Supreme Court did.10 See State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001) (reiterating

9

Napue even considers a conviction to be knowingly based on false evidence when the
prosecutor did not intentionally elicit the false testimony (i.e., did not suborn the perjury) and the
government only learned the testimony was false after the fact. Id.
10
In fact, the standard articulated in Drapeau, which the State asserts the district court should
have used instead of Scroggins (App. Br., pp.11-14), is higher even than the Scroggins standard.
Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366. Therefore, the State’s proposed alternative would create even more
conflict with Napue than Scroggins would.
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that the United States Supreme Court sets the constitutional floor). However, if Scroggins is
properly understood to apply to defense witnesses as well as government witnesses, Scroggins
and Napue can be read more harmoniously, if the State’s premise about the focus being on who
called the witness is accurate at all.
For all those reasons, the State’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
applying the Scroggins standard instead of the Drapeau standard is meritless. The district court
recognized and applied the proper legal standard in ruling on Mr. Washington’s motion for a new
trial based on Ms. White’s recantation of her misleading trial testimony.

C.

The District Court Reasonably Exercised Its Discretion When It Decided To Grant
Mr. Washington’s Motion For A New Trial Under The Scroggins Standard
Scroggins has a three-pronged standard for determining whether a new trial is justified by

recanted testimony: “(1) that the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by
the material witness is false; (2) that without it, the jury might have reached a different
conclusion; [and] (3) that the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.”
Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85 (internal quotations omitted). The State has only challenged the
district court’s analysis on the first two prongs of that analysis. (See App. Br., pp.12-13.) The
State’s arguments in both regards are mistaken for numerous reasons.

1.

The district court’s finding that Ms. White’s testimony was, in fact, false was
supported by substantial evidence

The district court expressly found that Ms. White’s trial testimony was false because it
gave a significantly misleading impression of what happened to the jury. (Mtn. Tr., p.43,
Ls.11-12.) The question of whether the testimony is false is a question of fact. See State v.

12

Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 571 (1991) (deferring to the district court’s determination that the
testimony in that case was not perjurious because the district court had observed the witness’s
testimony and that was one reasonable inference which could be drawn from the record). That
means, so long as the district court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the appellate
courts will defer to such findings. Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 72.
That district court’s finding in this case was based on its observation of Ms. White’s
testimony during the trial and during the hearing on Mr. Washington’s motion. (Tr., p.41,
Ls.10-15.) Thus, like in Ramos, the district court’s conclusion was one reasonable inference it
could draw based on the evidence. Ramos, 119 Idaho at 571. In other words, that finding was
supported by substantial evidence, and, as such, that conclusion is entitled to deference.
The State contends that, because Ms. White only identified additional facts she could
have testified to, rather than disavowing a statement she had made at trial, her testimony was not
false. (App. Br., p.10 (“[Ms.] White did not recant her trial testimony. Rather, she only added to
it.”).) However, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained, the omission of certain relevant
facts made the testimony at issue “false and misleading.” State v. Lankford (Lankford II), 162
Idaho 477, 505 (2017). Therefore, the district court’s finding to that same effect in this case was
not unreasonable. Moreover, the State’s argument in that regard does not show, or even try to
show, that the district court’s contrary finding was not supported by substantial evidence. As
such, the State has failed to show any abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that
the statement was, in fact, false.

2.

The district court reasonably concluded that Ms. White’s testimony was material

The district court also concluded that Ms. White’s false testimony was material.
(Mtn. Tr., p.43, Ls.1-6.) That conclusion was reasonable based on the evidence in the record.

13

For example, there was no testimony offered during the trial that indicated the methamphetamine
itself was ever in the cooler. (See generally Trial Tr.) Thus, Ms. White’s new testimony – that
she put the black Ziploc bag of methamphetamine in the cooler without Mr. Washington’s
knowledge (Mtn. Tr., p.13, Ls.19-21) – was material to the knowledge element of the
methamphetamine charge, and thus, to the question of guilt or innocence. See State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 240 (1999) (explaining that knowledge that the substance is in one’s possession is an
element of possession of a controlled substance).
Along those same lines, Ms. White’s new testimony was also material because it
corroborated the testimony of Mr. Aref, the pawn shop employee. (See App. Br., pp.11-14.)
Mr. Aref’s testimony was offered to support the defense’s proposition that the methamphetamine
was not in the briefcase, and thus, not knowingly within Mr. Washington’s possession.
(See Trial Tr., p.314, Ls.7-22 (Mr. Aref testifying that he saw inside the briefcase and saw only
the laptop and charger).) Ms. White’s new testimony corroborated that testimony, and therefore,
also provides evidence in favor of the defense’s proposition, because it verified the
methamphetamine was not in the briefcase because it she had put it in the cooler. (See Mtn.
Tr., p.13, Ls.18-21.)
The State does not actually address the fact that Ms. White’s new testimony was material
with respect to the methamphetamine charge. (See generally App. Br.) Instead, it contends that
her new testimony failed the first prong of Scroggins because it was not material to the
paraphernalia charge. (App. Br., p.13.) Specifically, it argued that, because the jurors had
convicted Mr. Washington on the paraphernalia charge even though Ms. White had testified at
the trial that she saw some paraphernalia in the cooler, Ms. White’s new testimony could not be

14

material. 11 (App. Br., p.13.) However, since Ms. White’s new testimony tends to corroborate
Mr. Aref’s testimony that he saw nothing besides the computer and charger in the briefcase,
Ms. White’s new testimony is actually material to the knowledge element of the paraphernalia
charge.
At any rate, the premise underlying the State’s argument is fundamentally flawed.
Because of the way the prosecutor articulated the paraphernalia charge, the jurors did not
actually have to reject Ms. White’s testimony in order to convict Mr. Washington on the
paraphernalia charge. The prosecutor specifically alleged the possession of a glass pipe and a
digital scale as the basis of the paraphernalia charge. (R., p.61.) The evidence presented at trial
discussed two pipes – one allegedly in the cooler and one allegedly in the briefcase. (See Trial
Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.18, L.2, p.20, L.25 - p.22, L.13.) As a result, the jurors could have believed
Ms. White’s testimony – that she saw a pipe, a pen cap, and a scale in the cooler, where
Mr. Washington would not have known they were – and still convicted Mr. Washington on the
paraphernalia charge based on Officer Coleman’s testimony that he found a second pipe in the
briefcase. (R., pp.61, 176.) In fact, the jury’s question about whether paraphernalia charge
referred to the item in State’s Exhibit 1 (allegedly found in the briefcase), rather than the glass
pipe in State’s Exhibit 2 (allegedly found in the cooler), since the cooler had been removed from
their consideration, suggests that is exactly what they did. (R., p.176.)

11

Evidence can be material even if there is contrary evidence in the record. Therefore, the
State’s argument in this regard is actually more appropriately understood to be an argument
under the second prong of Scroggins – whether there would likely be a different result – than an
assertion that Ms. White’s new testimony was not relevant to a fact of consequence.
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Ultimately, though, regardless of whether Ms. White’s new testimony was material to the
paraphernalia charge, it was still material to the methamphetamine charge, which means it still
satisfies the first prong of Scroggins.

3.

The district court reasonably concluded that the jury might have reached a
different conclusion based on Ms. White’s new testimony

The State’s argument on the second prong of Scroggins analysis disregards the standard
Scroggins actually set.

Specifically, the State asserted that “the changed testimony—

[Ms.] White’s claim she placed some of the contraband in the cooler—is not more likely to
produce an acquittal.” (App. Br., pp.12-13.) Scroggins, does not require the moving party to
prove that he likely would be “acquitted” – it only requires the moving party to show the jury
“might have reached a different conclusion.” Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85 (emphasis added);
see Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366 (noting Scroggins and Drapeau are different standards and
explaining that Scroggins’ “might” standard is also lower than Drapeau’s “probably” standard).
There are other conclusions a jury might reach besides just outright acquittal. For example, it
could convict on some charges but not others; it could convict on lesser included offenses; or it
could hang and cause a mistrial. As such, what the second prong of Scroggins actually requires
the moving party to show is the possibility that one juror might have had reasonable doubt about
the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense in light of the accurate (the unperjured) testimony.
To that point, the Idaho Supreme Court has revealed that the question of whether a juror
could have had a reasonable doubt is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable juror, not the
appellate court’s independent weighing of the new evidence in the first instance.

State v.

Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015). In Thomas, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that, because a reasonable juror could have believed the erroneously-omitted
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evidence, there was a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, which meant the omission of
that evidence was not harmless. Id. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion despite the fact
that the Court of Appeals opinion from which it had granted review, and to which it gave serious
consideration, had held that error was harmless based on the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
the other evidence weighed strong in the State’s favor. Compare id. with State v. Thomas, 2014
WL 1266316 (Ct. App. 2014).
Similarly, here, a reasonable juror could have believed Ms. White’s new testimony that
the methamphetamine was inside the cooler instead of the officer’s testimony that it was in the
briefcase.

In fact, that possibility is more likely since Ms. White’s new testimony was

corroborated by Mr. Aref’s testimony that he did not see anything besides the computer and
charger in the briefcase (Trial Tr., p.314, Ls.7-22), and Officer Coleman’s testimony, which
revealed there was no point after Mr. Washington left the pawn shop during which he could have
moved the methamphetamine from the cooler to the briefcase. (See Trial Tr., p.9, L.1 - p.10, L.6
(Officer Coleman testifying he watched Mr. Washington leave the pawn shop and drive away,
and that he quickly pulled Mr. Washington over).)

Certainly, Officer Coleman, who was

watching Mr. Washington that whole time, did not mention seeing any actions suggesting that he
had moved anything from the back seat area into the briefcase during that short window of time.
(See generally Trial Tr., pp.1-128.)
The officer’s testimony revealed other facts which reinforce the possibility that a
reasonable juror might believe Ms. White’s new testimony and conclude that Officer Coleman
had misremembered (or more troubling, deliberately misrepresented) in which container he had
found the methamphetamine. For example, Officer Coleman admitted that he had affirmatively
shut off his body camera during the search of the car. (Trial Tr., p.98, Ls.10-14.) He also
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admitted that he did not take, nor did he ask anyone else to take, any photographs of the
evidence, either as he found it in the containers or separately. (Trial Tr., p.100, L.9 - p.101,
L.24, p.103, L.3.) In fact, he admitted that he did not even take the briefcase into evidence.
(Trial Tr., p.105, Ls.7-10.)
To that point, the juror’s questions (R., p.176) show they actually did harbor reasonable
doubts about whether they could convict Mr. Washington based on the items found in the cooler.
Compare Thomas, 342 P.3d at 631-32 (explaining that the answer to the jurors’ question
reinforced the conclusion that there was a possibility the jurors had a reasonable doubt as to
guilt). Since Ms. White’s new testimony put the methamphetamine in the cooler, there is a
possibility that a reasonable juror might harbor those same doubts in regard to the
methamphetamine charge. Therefore, considering all the evidence in the record, there was a
possibility that a reasonable juror might reach a different conclusion after hearing Ms. White’s
unpurjured testimony, and that is all Scroggins requires.
As such, the State has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision
to grant Mr. Washington’s motion for a new trial. Rather, its decision in that regard was reached
through an exercise of reasoned assessment of the evidence and was consistent with the
applicable legal standards articulated in Scroggins.

D.

Even If This Court Concludes The District Court Should Have Used The Drapeau
Standard, It Should Affirm The District Court’s Decision To Grant The Motion For A
New Trial
As an initial matter, the State’s assertion – that this Court should actually reverse the

district court’s order under the Drapeau standard (see App. Br., p.13) – is meritless. Since the
district court did not make any findings under the Drapeau standard, the appropriate course of
action, if this Court were to conclude that Drapeau was the governing standard, would be to
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remand this case for the district court to make the necessary findings under the proper standard in
the first instance. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009).
And even if this Court considers the merits of the evidence under Drapeau, it should still
affirm the district court’s decision because the evidence presented was sufficient to meet the
Drapeau standard. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-76 (2017) (noting that an
appellate court can affirm the district court under the concept of “right result, wrong reason,”
when, as here, the alternative rationale was actually argued below). The State did not challenge
the district court’s findings on the first and fourth prongs of the Drapeau standard in this appeal.
(See generally App. Br.) In fact, the district court reasonably concluded that Mr. Washington
and his attorney were not aware of the falsity of Ms. White’s testimony until after the trial and
their failure to be aware of that fact was not due to a lack of due diligence on their part.
(Mtn. Tr., p.45, Ls.1-4.)

Thus, the first and fourth prongs of the Drapeau standard were

satisfied. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691.
Under the second prong of the Drapeau analysis, as discussed in Section C(2) supra, the
district court reasonably found that the testimony was material, as it provided evidence against
the knowledge elements of the charged offenses and corroborated Mr. Aref’s testimony.
(Mtn. Tr., p.43, Ls.1-6.) Therefore, the second prong of Drapeau was satisfied. See Drapeau,
97 Idaho at 691.
Finally, the facts which showed the possibility of a different conclusion under Scroggins
were also sufficient to satisfy the higher standard under Drapeau’s third prong – that the new
evidence would probably produce an acquittal. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. In fact, the Idaho
Supreme Court has explained that this sort of evidence of meets that standard because “[i]t
simply cannot be said that it was not probable that this new evidence – that showed [the witness]
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testified falsely, and likely intentionally, in the Ellington trial – would have affected the jury’s
determination of reasonable doubt, because it went straight to the heart of the defense’s main
theory of the case.”12 Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 75-76. Here, too, the new evidence showed there
was perjured testimony which would have affected the jury’s determination of reasonable doubt
and its understanding of Mr. Washington’s main theory of the case. (See Section C(3), supra.)
Thus, as in Ellington I, the new evidence here satisfied the third prong of Drapeau.
Since the new evidence in this case satisfied all four prongs of the Drapeau test, this
Court should still affirm the district court’s decision to grant Mr. Washington’s motion for a new
trial even if it determines the district court should have used the Drapeau standard instead of the
Scroggins standard.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Washington respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order granting
his motion for a new trial.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

12

Ellington I used the Drapeau standard instead of the Scroggins standard because the evidence
which revealed the testimony was perjured was not a recantation by the witness himself, but
prior, contradictory statements he had made in other contexts. See Ellington I, 151 Idaho at
73-74.
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